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After incidentally learning about a hidden regularity, participants can either continue to
solve the task as instructed or, alternatively, apply a shortcut. Past research suggests that
the amount of conﬂict implied by adopting a shortcut seems to bias the decision for vs.
against continuing instruction-coherent task processing.We exploredwhether this decision
might transfer from one incidental learning task to the next. Theories that conceptualize
strategy change in incidental learning as a learning-plus-decision phenomenon suggest
that high demands to adhere to instruction-coherent task processing inTask 1 will impede
shortcut usage in Task 2, whereas low control demands will foster it. We sequentially
applied two established incidental learning tasks differing in stimuli, responses and hidden
regularity (the alphabet veriﬁcation task followed by the serial reaction task, SRT). While
some participants experienced a complete redundancy in the task material of the alphabet
veriﬁcation task (low demands to adhere to instructions), for others the redundancy was
only partial. Thus, shortcut application would have led to errors (high demands to follow
instructions). The low control demand condition showed the strongest usage of the ﬁxed
and repeating sequence of responses in the SRT. The transfer results are in line with
the learning-plus-decision view of strategy change in incidental learning, rather than with
resource theories of self-control.
Keywords: incidental learning, information reduction, serial reaction task, transfer, cognitive conflict, instruction
following, pliance
INTRODUCTION
The human factors literature counts many cases where, with expe-
rience, people change from processing a task as instructed to
applying a shortcut (Reason, 1990; Niessen et al., 1999; Under-
wood et al., 2002). This has triggered experimental work on
incidental learning to explore the role of cognitive control in strat-
egy change (e.g., Strayer and Kramer, 1994; Haider and Frensch,
1999; Touron and Hertzog, 2004a,b; Haider et al., 2005; Hoyndorf
and Haider, 2009). In some experimental setups participants who
had discovered a shortcut were faced with high vs. low demands to
adhere to instruction-coherent task processing instead of applying
the shortcut. For instance, Gaschler and Frensch (2009) instructed
participants to check strings for alphabet errors (see Figure 1A
for an example). With practice, participants could learn that
some string positions rarely contained alphabet errors so that
time could be saved by skipping these positions when checking
the strings. Experimental conditions differed in the amount of
alphabet errors in these less relevant string positions. Disregard-
ing the instruction to exhaustively check the strings led to few
errors for one group of participants (low demand to secure adher-
ence to instructions). On average this group showed a higher rate
of shortcut usage than the group for which more errors would
have resulted from disregarding the instructions (high control
demand).
Importantly, the number of errors that one would commit
using the shortcut seemed to affect performance by inﬂuencing the
probability that a participant fully used the shortcut vs. refrained
from using it. Thus, an all-or-non adjustment of control was
observed. While some participants started to use the shortcut on
all following trials after some practice, others completely refrained
from using it. Conﬂict level (i.e., level of errors implied by short-
cut usage) was inﬂuencing how many of the participants used the
shortcut, rather than to what extent they used it. The link between
conﬂict level and shortcut-based errors seems plausible, given
that response errors have been tied to similar control processes
and neural substrates driving behavioral adjustment as the ones
involved in case of competing response tendencies, decision uncer-
tainty and unfavorable outcomes (e.g., Ridderinkhof et al., 2004).
The adjustment of shortcut usage to control demands is in line
with work suggesting that strategy change in incidental learning
is based on a general decision to apply or not apply an inciden-
tally discovered shortcut (e.g., Haider and Frensch, 1996, 2002).
When people apply the shortcut, they do so for practiced and
novel stimuli alike (cf. Gaschler et al., 2014a). For instance, Touron
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FIGURE 1 |Task material in the alphabet verification task (A) and the serial reaction task (SRT; B).
and Hertzog (2004a,b) reported that most older (as compared to
younger) research participants in incidental learning experiments
were reluctant to apply a shortcut they had learned. While they
had sufﬁciently memorized the set of search items in a match-to-
sample visual search task to avoid visual search in favor of faster
memory search, they continued to solve the task as instructed. As
the shortcut option is not mentioned in the instructions of inci-
dental learning tasks, participants cannot be sure that the shortcut
option they eventually discovered will hold throughout the exper-
iment. In addition to the insecurity regarding the reliability of the
shortcut, some participants reported reluctance to apply a short-
cut because they placed more emphasis on accuracy than speed
(see also Haider and Frensch, 1999).
Following or disregarding instructions is not a one-shot game.
Learning theorists have suggested that people follow instructions,
because they have generalized episodes in which instruction fol-
lowing was reinforced (e.g., Hayes et al., 1986, 2001; Törneke
et al., 2008). On the one hand, participants might thus learn
about contexts in which it generally pays off to follow instruc-
tions. On the other hand, they should also be able to learn under
which conditions it is more advantageous to apply a shortcut
instead of sticking to instruction-coherent task processing. As sug-
gested above, people might decide to apply a shortcut, based on
the experience that it rarely or never leads to errors. However,
adaptation to the conﬂict level that a shortcut implies might not
only affect processing of the current task, but also transfers to
other tasks. Having experienced an incidental learning task in
which a potential shortcut leads to few vs. many errors might
inﬂuence the likelihood to adopt a shortcut discovered in a later
task.
Theories that view strategy change as a phenomenon involving
both, the learning of a shortcut option, as well as the decision to
apply it or to refrain from applying it (e.g., Touron and Hertzog,
2004a,b; Gaschler et al., 2014a) can predict that experience with
one incidental learning task offering a shortcut option, transfers
to a second incidental learning task (see discussion for compet-
ing theories). Prior experience with low demands to refrain from
shortcut usage will foster shortcut usage in the next incidental
learning task. This is because the experience that shortcut appli-
cation did not lead to errors in the ﬁrst task, could bias the
expectation that this would not be the case either in the next
task (for expectation effects on conﬂict processing within task cf.
Duthoo et al., 2013; or review by Gaschler et al., 2014b). Thus,
after working on a task in which a shortcut could be discovered
and adopted, participants should be more likely to use a shortcut
on a task presented later on. Conversely, prior experience with a
setup where the demands to refrain from applying a shortcut are
high, could lead to the expectation of high control demands for
the next task. In this case, participants would be more likely to
refrain from using a shortcut in Task 2. A baseline condition not
working on Task 1 should show intermediate levels of shortcut
usage.
In the current experiment, we combined two established inci-
dental learning tasks in order to study transfer of control demands.
We used control demands in the task applied ﬁrst as an indepen-
dent variable and performance in the second task as a dependent
variable. In two conditions participants ﬁrst worked on the alpha-
bet veriﬁcation task (e.g., Haider and Frensch, 1996; Green and
Wright, 2003; Figure 1A) and then on a variant of the serial
reaction task (SRT; e.g., Nissen and Bullemer, 1987; Abrahamse
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et al., 2010; Figure 1B). In the alphabet veriﬁcation task partic-
ipants are instructed to tediously check alphanumeric strings.
Yet they learn that these strings contain a redundant section
that could be skipped. In the SRT participants receive choice
reaction instructions for a consistent stimulus-response map-
ping. Instead of choosing reactions based on the stimulus of
the current trial as instructed, they can substantially simplify
task processing by learning and applying the ﬁxed repeating
sequence of stimuli and responses. While in typical variants
of the SRT the sequence is long and learning remains implicit
(e.g., Abrahamse et al., 2010), we used a variant with a short
and simple sequence – similar to experiments in which partic-
ipants have become aware of the sequence and became able to
produce reactions without paying attention to the stimuli (cf.
Haider and Rose, 2007; Rünger and Frensch, 2008; Schwager
et al., 2012). Our variant of the SRT was constructed such that
large gains in performance based on sequence knowledge were
possible. Tubau et al. (2007, see also Verwey and Wright, 2014)
showed that sequence knowledge allows participants to change
from stimulus-based responding to memory-based responding.
We used a rather simple repeating sequence. The six stimuli
and keys were each presented once. The rationale behind this
setup, established in Rünger and Frensch (2008), is that peo-
ple would neither ﬁnd it difﬁcult to represent nor implement
the shortcut option, once they have learned it – allowing us
to focus on control demands (minimizing strategy performance
problems).
As a novel approach to continuously assess sequence knowl-
edge throughout practice, we included randomly interspersed
ambiguous stimuli. If participants know the repeating sequence,
they can give the response that would have been due accord-
ing to the ﬁxed repeating sequence if an ambiguous stimulus
is presented. Otherwise they have to guess a response as the
stimulus cannot be discriminated. In addition, we adopted a
more traditional measure of sequence knowledge. Studies using
the SRT usually measure sequence knowledge after practice with
the sequential regularity by assessing the reaction time slowing
in off-sequence blocks or randomly interspersed off-sequence
deviant trials in comparison to trials following the sequence (e.g.,
Schvaneveldt and Gomez, 1998; Shanks et al., 2003; Abrahamse
et al., 2010; Gaschler et al., 2012). We used this measure by ran-
domly inserting deviant trials. We did so only at the end of
practice, as reports of participants starting to rely on memory-
based instead of stimulus-based response selection in the SRT
come from setups using sequences without deviants (e.g., Tubau
et al., 2007; Rünger and Frensch, 2008; Schwager et al., 2012).
Providing a further reason for saving this measure for the end
of practice, Verwey and Wright (2014) reported RT data sug-
gesting that deviants might suppress the expression of sequence
knowledge.
In summary, the present study set out to examine whether
shortcut usage in one task transfers to a subsequent task. We
hypothesized that prior experience with a setup where a short-
cut can be safely applied should lead to increased shortcut usage
in a second incidental learning task. Conversely, prior exposure
to a shortcut which would lead to errors should reduce shortcut
usage in the second task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred and four students from different Berlin-based uni-
versities took part in the experiment and were paid € 10 (69
female; mean age 24.8 years, SD = 5.2). When entering the lab,
participants were randomly assigned to the low or high control
demand condition without knowledge of the experimenter. Con-
ditions differed in the variant of the alphabet veriﬁcation task
that they were presented before working on the SRT. The partici-
pants of the baseline conditionworked only on the SRT. Therefore,
they were in the lab for a shorter time and were treated sepa-
rately by the experimenter. Exclusion of four participants (see
results) led to 32 participants in both, the high and the low control
demand condition and 36 participants in the baseline condition.
The experiment took place in the laboratories of the Psychol-
ogy Department of Humboldt-Universität Berlin. We obtained
informed consent from theparticipants and approval by the ethical
review board.
MATERIALS AND APPARATUS OF TASK 1: ALPHABET VERIFICATION
TASK
The stimuli in the alphabet veriﬁcation task consisted of 48
alphanumeric strings (e.g., C D E F G 4 L; see Figure 1A), pre-
sented two times in each of the four blocks of practice. Half of the
strings were valid, following the order of the alphabet; the other
half were invalid, deviating from it. The digit 4 in the letter-digit-
letter triplet indicated that the next four consecutive letters of the
alphabet needed to be skipped at this string location, and that
the string would continue with the ﬁfth letter. Thus, “M 4 R,” for
instance, was to be interpreted as “M, skip N, O, P, Q, continue
with R.” There were either no, two or four letters forming a preﬁx
before the letter-digit-letter triplet.
In the low control demand condition, violations of the alpha-
betical order only occurred in the letter-digit-letter triplet (ﬁve
instead of the indicated four letters ﬁtting the void). The pre-
ﬁx (i.e., the letter in front of the letter-digit-letter triplet) was
always correct. In the high control demand condition, however,
the preﬁx was free of errors only in 75% rather than 100% of
the trials. The letters outside the triplet could therefore not be
safely ignored. As in other work on strategy change with the
alphabet veriﬁcation task (e.g., Gaschler and Frensch, 2007), the
length of the preﬁx was varied in order to obtain a reaction time
measure of the extent of preﬁx processing. As long as partici-
pants adhere to the instructions and check the strings exhaustively,
longer strings should lead to higher reaction times as compared to
shorter strings. The impact of string length on RT should dimin-
ish with practice to the extent that participants stop to check the
preﬁxes.
Each trial started with a ﬁxation cross presented centrally for
200 ms that was followed by an alphanumeric string. Strings were
centrally presented in bold Courier New font, size 26, at the center
of a 17-inch CRT screen in black color on a light yellow back-
ground, controlled by a PC. The font ensured constant spacing
between letters. The letters were ∼1.1◦ × 0.9◦ in size. Consecu-
tive letters appeared ∼0.9◦ apart on the screen. After the manual
response was registered, the string was erased from the screen and
there was a blank interval of 200 ms before the ﬁxation cross of
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the next trial appeared. Incorrect responses were immediately fol-
lowed by a high tone as error signal. Participants responded by
pressing either the “y” or the “,” key on the second row from the
bottom on a standard German PC keyboard. Half of the partic-
ipants were instructed to use the “y” key to indicate that a string
was valid and the “,” key to indicate that the string was invalid; for
the other half, the key assignment was reversed.
In the computerized instructions, the characteristics of the
alphanumeric stringswere described, and participantswere shown
how to evaluate the strings. Participants were instructed to pay
attention to the entire string because errors could occur anywhere
in the string. Furthermore, they were told to respond as quickly as
possible while keeping the rate of errors below 10%. The alphanu-
meric strings used as examples in the instructions and in the 10
practice trials (triplets starting with E and F) contained violations
of the alphabetical order outside the letter-digit-letter triplet and
were not from the pool of material used for the rest of the task.
The task was completed within ∼45 min.
MATERIALS AND APPARATUS OF TASK 2: SRT
In each trial, participants saw a random cloud of 72 dots, each
colored in one of six colors for 250 ms in a centrally presented
frame (Figure 1B). The frame was drawn in gray lines on a black
background. Afterward, the cloud disappeared and the program
awaited a response. A new stimulus was displayed after a response
stimulus interval (RSI) of 100ms. In order to allow for executionof
fast response sequences (e.g., based on sequence knowledge), the
stimulus presentation ended early in case participants responded
during the stimulus presentation. Except on some irregular trials,
(see below) one color was much more frequent (52 dots) as com-
pared to the other ﬁve (four dots each) in each trial. At a distance
of 3.6◦ beneath the 4.4◦ × 4.4◦ frame with the dots, a row of col-
ored squares indicated the mapping between the dominant color
and the response. Each color box was 1.2◦ high and 1◦ wide and
the spacing was 0.5◦. Participants responded with the keys on the
lower row of the keyboard (X to M) using index, middle, and ring
ﬁngers which they should keep resting on the keys. The keys were
numbered 1 to 6 with stickers and the mapping of colors to keys
was constant throughout the task.
Unbeknownst to the participants, stimuli (dominant stimu-
lus colors) and the required responses followed a simple ﬁxed
repeating sequence. Sequences were drawn from a pool of 24 ﬁrst-
order sequences of length six. Each of the six stimuli and responses
occurred once and this sequence was constantly repeated. To avoid
salient spatial patterns in the response positions, the sequences did
not contain “runs” of three or more adjacent response locations
(e.g., 1-2-3, 6-5-4 with responses numbered from left to right; cf.
Rünger and Frensch, 2008). The selection of the sequences was
matched between the conditions of the experiment.
Each of the seven blocks of the SRT consisted of 108 regular
and 12 irregular trials. An auditory error feedback was pre-
sented during the RSI on regular trials, while any response in
the irregular trials was regarded as correct. With (1) ambiguous
and (2) deviant trials, we used two different kinds of irregular
trials in different blocks in order to assess usage of sequence
knowledge – the dependent variable of the experiment. Stimuli
in irregular trials in Blocks 1 to 6 were maximally ambiguous.
The cloud of dots contained dots of all colors with equal fre-
quency. Thus, the stimulus did not suggest any of the six responses
more strongly than the other ﬁve. Therefore, sequence knowl-
edge should be measurable in a response bias. For instance,
the ambiguous stimulus in Figure 1B elicits the response for
green. As this response was due according to the ﬁxed repeat-
ing sequence, such a response suggests sequence knowledge. No
sequence knowledge would be evident if the participant pressed
the key according to the sequence only at chance level (match
in 1/6th of the ambiguous trials). If participants acquire knowl-
edge about the ﬁxed repeating sequence and decide to exploit it
for the simpliﬁcation of task processing, they should not only
pass chance level in choosing responses according to the repeat-
ing sequence. Rather they should start to consistently respond
according to the ﬁxed and repeating sequence in the ambiguous
trials.
In Block 7, the stimuli in deviant trials had a dominant color
that did not follow the sequence. For instance, instead of a cloud of
predominantly yellowdots that should appear based on the repeat-
ing sequence, a predominantly blue stimulus might be randomly
inserted instead. Random deviants were drawn such that imme-
diate repetitions of responses were avoided. Sequence knowledge
was assessed as the reaction time difference between, on the one
hand, the irregular trials and their immediate successors, and, on
the other hand, the remainder of the trials with correct responses.
We included the immediate successor of the deviant as a poten-
tially slowed trial in order to increase the number of trials available
for the RT estimate.
PROCEDURE
Except for the baseline condition, participants started the experi-
ment with the alphabet veriﬁcation task. No references were made
as to whether a part of the stimuli could be safely ignored or
not. After completing the alphabet veriﬁcation task, the experi-
menter started the automatized instructions of the serial reaction
time task. Participants were told that this task is a speeded forced
choice stimulus discrimination task. In doing so, no underlying
regularities in the taskmaterial werementioned. The experimenter
then watched the ﬁrst ﬁve trials to make sure that participants
had properly understood the instructions. Only after complet-
ing the SRT participants were asked whether or not (forced
choice) it would have been possible for them to skip checking
a part of the string positions of the alphabet veriﬁcation task (see
results on manipulation check). Also the experimenter inquired
about verbalizable sequence knowledge (SRT). Participants were
asked to recall the ﬁxed repeating sequence or otherwise guess
a sequence of six elements. For each participant, the pattern of
the correctly verbalized portion(s) of the trained sequence was
compared to a simulation in order to estimate the likelihood
that it was based on guessing (see Rünger and Frensch, 2008).
The simulation determined how often the speciﬁc pattern of
correct verbalizations observed for a participant (e.g., a triplet
correct) would be obtained by matching the training sequence
with a randomly generated sequence 10 million times. If the spe-
ciﬁc pattern of correct verbalizations occurred with low relative
frequency in random matching, it was likely not the result of
guessing.
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RESULTS
SCREENING OF THE DATA
Screening of the data suggested that there was no speed–accuracy
trade-off. In both tasks error trials tended to be slower rather than
faster as compared to correct trials. In the low control demand
condition, one participant did not fully complete the alphabet
veriﬁcation task and three participants were excluded because of
error rates higher than 30%. The mean error rate of the remaining
participants of the high control demand condition (N = 32) and
those of the low control demand condition (N = 32) was 7.5%
for either group. See below for SRT error rates of these conditions
and the baseline condition (N = 36).
MANIPULATION CHECKS
In the main analysis below we employed presence and variant
of the alphabet veriﬁcation task (high control demand con-
dition, low control demand condition, baseline condition) as
an independent variable for performance in the SRT. Before-
hand, we checked whether the manipulation of the feasibility
of information reduction actually led to performance effects in
the alphabet veriﬁcation task itself. As participants in the low
control demand condition could safely skip to check some of
the string positions, it was to be expected that they should be
generally faster than participants of the high control demand
condition. Furthermore, RTs in the low control demand condi-
tion should be less strongly inﬂuenced by string length, because
the string preﬁxes (letters before the letter-digit-letter triplet) of
varying length did not contain to-be-spotted alphabet errors and
thus could be skipped. The data presented in Figure 2 are in
line with these predictions. A mixed ANOVA on RTs, includ-
ing block and string length as within-subjects factor and control
demand as a between-subjects factor showed a main effect of
control demand condition, F(1,62) = 7.53, MSE = 16480000,
p = 0.008, η2p = 0.11, of block of practice, F(3,186) = 76.93,
MSE = 1601747, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.55, and of string length on
RT, F(2,124) = 72.43, MSE = 447654, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.54.
Furthermore, there was an interaction between control demand
condition and string length, F(2,124) = 4.53, MSE = 447654,
p = 0.013, η2p = 0.07, as string length was of less inﬂuence for
participants of the low control demand condition than for par-
ticipants who could not safely skip to check the string preﬁxes.
With practice there was a decrease of processing of the string posi-
tions containing alphabet errors rarely or never, F(6,372) = 2.55,
MSE = 204073, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.04, for the interaction between
block of practice and string length (other Fs < 1.1). Note that
we applied Greenhouse–Geisser correction in the ANOVAs when
necessary.
Participants proved knowledgeable about whether or not infor-
mation reduction had been possible in the version of the alphabet
veriﬁcation task they had been practicing. When asked to guess
whether or not the preﬁx letters in their version of the task
had or had not always been in correct alphabetical order, all
participants of the high control demand condition correctly stated
that errors in the alphabetical order had occurred in the let-
ters placed in front of the letter-digit-letter triplet. Four of the
participants in the low control demand condition incorrectly
stated that this was the case in their version of the task as well,
FIGURE 2 | Means of individual median reaction times. On the x -axis,
reaction times for short, medium, and long strings (s, m, l) are grouped
together by block in order to display the amount of processing of irrelevant
information. The impact of string length on RT is stronger in the high control
demand condition as compared to the low control demand condition,
indicating more processing of the additional letters when information
reduction is not possible. Note that error trials as well as RT of trials with
violations of the alphabetical order (high control demand condition) were
excluded. Note that performance for the two conditions was very similar
during the very ﬁrst trials of Block 1 and quickly diverged afterward. This
was evident when we compared (a) the trials of Block 1 that occurred
before participants in the high control demand condition encountered the
ﬁrst strings with violation of the alphabetical order outside the
letter-digit-letter triplet with (b) the yoked trials of the low control demand
condition. As soon as participants in the high control demand condition
were confronted with the strings including incorrect preﬁxes (RT from the
latter trials being excluded from main analysis) RT differences between the
conditions quickly developed. Error bars: between-subjects standard error
of the mean.
while the others correctly reported that the preﬁxes had always
been correct.
SLOWING BY OFF-SEQUENCE STIMULI
In linewith other implicit and incidental sequence learning studies
we assessed sequence knowledge indirectly by comparing trials
that follow the ﬁxed repeating sequence with off-sequence trials
at the end of practice. The RT difference between regular and
deviant (plus following) trials in Block 7 is displayed in Figure 3.
The ANOVA with control demand condition as between subjects
factor showed a main effect of control demand, F(2,97) = 3.33,
MSE = 11539.79, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.064. Slowing was strongest
for participants in the low control demand condition and weakest
for those of the high control demand condition (these conditions
yielded the only signiﬁcant pair comparison according to Tukey-
HSD, p = 0.04). The baseline condition lay in between.
SEQUENCE FOLLOWED IN AMBIGUOUS TRIALS
Figure 4A suggests a practice-related increase in this dependent
measure – the rate of ambiguous stimuli eliciting a response
according to the repeating sequence. The mixed ANOVA with
the factors block of practice and control demand condition
showed a main effect of block of practice, F(3.48,337.48) = 15.78,
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FIGURE 3 | Reaction time slowing in trials with off-sequence deviants
in the SRT. Error bars: between-subjects standard error of the mean.
MSE = 444.96, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.14, and an interaction of
practice and control demand condition, F(6.96,337.48) = 2.25,
MSE = 444.96, p = 0.038, η2p = 0.04, but no main effect of con-
trol demand condition, F(2,97) = 1.1. The increase in sequence
following across blocks was strongest in the low control demand
condition. As detailed below, between-participant variability in
sequence-following in ambiguous trials was substantial. There-
fore, we secured that the abovementioned pattern of results also
holds with a more robust statistic. For this we determined the
percentage of participants per condition and block of practice
who showed above chance sequence following. We determined
(based on the binomial distribution) how many sequence follow-
ing responseswithin the 12 ambiguous trials per block of practice a
participant should accumulate to be classiﬁed as an above-chance
sequence follower for that block. Seven of 12 responses (i.e.,>50%
sequence following) are sufﬁcient for p < 0.001. Supporting the
above analysis, the percentage of sequence followers (Figure 4B)
showed a similar pattern as the average rate of sequence follow-
ing (Figure 4A). It increased the most in the low control demand
condition, X2 (2) = 6.93, p = 0.031, for the across-condition
comparison of the rate in the last block of practice. Note that the
Block 6 rate also mirrors the overall increase with practice, as all
conditions started from 0 in Block 1.
Several participants eventually started to consistently respond
to the randomly interspersed ambiguous trials according to what
the ﬁxed sequence would have suggested. Run analyses were
employed to explore the consistency of sequence following. Guess-
ing should lead to sequence-followed responses on individual
ambiguous trials, but not on whole runs of them. Consistent
replacement of random key presses to ambiguous stimuli by
sequence memory-based responses was captured by determin-
ing the maximum run length of sequence-following responses
in ambiguous trials. We used the ambiguous trials as probes of
sequence following that were randomly inserted into the repeat-
ing sequence of regular trials. Thus, runs span over many regular
FIGURE 4 |The average rate of % ambiguous trials the sequence was
followed in the SRT increases over blocks of practice (chance
level = 16.7%;A). (B) Shows the proportion of participants using the
sequence in at least 50% of the ambiguous trials of the respective block
(i.e., p < 0.001 for that participant in that block). (C) Shows the distribution
of sequence usage in the SRT. A larger proportion of participants of the low
control demand condition as compared to the other conditions showed
long chains of consistent sequence memory-based responses on randomly
interspersed ambiguous trials. Error bars: between-subjects standard error
of the mean or the proportion.
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trials. For instance, a participant with a maximum run length of
30 has responded according to the ﬁxed sequence without inter-
ruption for more than two blocks of practice (i.e., 12 ambiguous
trials per block).
Cases where participants started to consistently respond
according to the repeating sequence were especially pronounced
in the low control demand condition. The maximum run length
of sequence-consistent responses on subsequent ambiguous tri-
als determined per participant was on average M = 8.9. It was
M = 4.6 in the high control demand and the baseline condition.
As depicted in Figure 4C, the distribution was heavily skewed in
all conditions, as many participants did not show consistent usage
of sequence knowledge in ambiguous trials. Yet, the low control
demand condition yielded a high proportion of participants with
especially long runs as compared to the other conditions. While 14
of the participants of the low control demand condition showed
runs longer than four (four being the median of this condition;
p< 0.001 for four consecutive hits;Maximum= 54 ambiguous tri-
als), only six of the participants in both the high control demand
condition and the baseline condition (Maximum = 30 and 29)
showed sequence-consistent responses of the same run-length,
X2(2)= 7.74, p= 0.025. In summary, different indicators converge
in suggesting stronger usage of incidentally acquired sequence
knowledge following the low control demand condition com-
pared to the high control demand condition (and intermediate
performance for the baseline condition).
FOLLOW-UP ANALYSES ON ERROR RATES AND REACTION TIMES
Unexpectedly, the mean error rate for the regular trials of Blocks
1 to 6 of the SRT (Figure 5A) was higher for the baseline condi-
tion (M = 5%) compared to the low control demand condition
(M = 2.8%) and the high control demand condition (M = 3.4%).
The baseline condition differed from the other two conditions
according to Tukey-HSD (ps< 0.05). An ANOVA including block
of practice and control demand condition showed a main effect
of practice, as error rates decreased, F(3.27,316.744) = 5.08,
MSE = 9.19, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.05, and a main effect of con-
trol demand condition, F(2,97) = 8.16, MSE = 31.93, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.14. There was no interaction of block and condition
(F = 1.08).
An analysis of the error rates in Block 7 (Figure 5B) showed that
participants produced more errors in deviant trials (compared to
regular trials). Error rate increased when exclusively taking into
account errors in line with the disrupted sequence, but also when
only considering errors in which participants neither followed
the sequence nor the current off-sequence stimulus. An ANOVA
including the error rates in regular vs. in deviant trials resulted in a
main effect of trial type, F(1,97) = 32.31, MSE = 112.2, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.25. There was neither a main effect of nor an interaction
involving control demand condition (Fs < 1). A large propor-
tion of errors in deviant trials were responses in line with what
the repeating sequence would have suggested. A main effect of
trial type (but no effects involving control demand condition) was
also obtained, when comparing error rate on regular trials with
the rate of sequence following in deviant trials, F(1,97) = 5.23,
MSE = 73.82, p = 0.024, η2p = 0.05. The pattern of a higher error
rate in deviant as compared to regular trials also held when only
FIGURE 5 | Error rates in regular trials over blocks of practice (A), error
rates and error type in deviant and regular trials of Block 7 (B), and
reaction times in correct regular trials over the course of practice (C).
Error bars: between-subjects standard error of the mean.
considering errors that were not in line with the response sug-
gested by the repeating sequence, F(1,97) = 7.18, MSE = 29.98,
p = 0.009, η2p = 0.07.
Last we analyzed how RT developed across blocks of practice
in regular trials. While Figure 5C suggests that performance on
regular trials was slowest in the high control demand condition,
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this was not conﬁrmed by an ANOVA with block of practice and
control demand condition as factors. We obtained a main effect of
blockof practice, reﬂecting that participants became faster over the
six blocks of practice, F(2.38,230.94) = 132.56, MSE = 19705.33,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.58. However, there was neither a main effect
of control demand condition, F(2,97) = 2.06, nor an interaction
of block and control demand condition, F(4.76,230.94) = 1.59.
Note that an ANOVA involving trial type (regular trials vs.
ambiguous trials) and block of practice did not show a main
effect or interaction involving control demand condition either
(Fs< 1).
VERBALIZABLE SEQUENCE KNOWLEDGE
The three experimental conditions did not differ with respect
to the frequency with which the matches between verbalized
sequence parts and practiced sequence were obtained by random
matching in the simulation. The average relative frequencies were
13.39, 14.27, and 15.01%, for the low and high control demand
condition and the baseline condition respectively (F < 1). As we
administered the interview after the test block containing deviant
trials, one could suspect that the measure of verbalizable sequence
knowledge is too noisy to be useful. However, we obtained signiﬁ-
cant Spearman rank correlations of the measure with RT slowing
on deviant trials (r =−0.395) and with the proportion of ambigu-
ous trials responded to according to the ﬁxed sequence in the last
block of practice (r = −0.501; ps < 0.001). Thus, participants
showing stronger behavioral signs of sequence knowledge also
verbalized sequence patterns that were less frequently obtain in
a random matching simulation (i.e., their verbalization was less
likely based on guessing).
DISCUSSION
We observed transfer between two incidental learning tasks, the
alphabet veriﬁcation task and the SRT. Participants who had the
opportunity to discover and apply (low control demand condi-
tion) a shortcut in the ﬁrst task, were more likely to apply a
different shortcut in the second incidental learning task com-
pared to participants in the high control demand condition. Low
demands to adhere to instruction-based task processing in the
alphabet veriﬁcation task (i.e., option to skip to check some
string positions without that this would lead to errors) appar-
ently were transferred to the SRT (i.e., respond based on sequence
memory rather than based on stimuli). Less usage of sequence
knowledge was observed in the high control demand condition.
These participants had experienced that instruction-coherent task
processing has to be maintained as a shortcut would lead to
errors in the alphabet veriﬁcation task. The participants of the
baseline condition showed intermediate application of sequence
knowledge.
The two incidental learning tasks employedwere highly dissim-
ilar in terms of stimuli, responses, and hidden regularity that could
be exploited for task processing. Thus, the transfer across tasks
rules out that stimulus-speciﬁc processing episodes rather than
learningof control demands can account for the results. Rather, the
experiment illustrates general demand effects – an issue important
and hard to control in research with human participants. Hertwig
and Ortmann (2001) have for instance suggested that research
participants in psychological experiments often search for hidden
regularities in the task material, because they suspect that task
instructions convey a misleading or incomplete picture of what
the experiment is really about (see also Harlow, 1949; Gaissmaier
and Schooler, 2008). After taking part in an incidental learning
experiment, researchparticipantsmight (often falsely) assume that
hidden task regularities might be waiting to be found and safe to
exploit in other experiments of the same or maybe even other
research labs. This might distract them from performing tasks
as instructed, threatening the validity of studies not interested in
incidental learning and instruction following.
As the task material of the low control demand condition
was set up to support the belief that exploitable task regulari-
ties might exist, participants might have been inclined to also
search and apply shortcuts in the SRT afterward. Crucially, par-
ticipants in the low control demand condition experienced no
costs (i.e., errors) in applying the shortcut (rather than processing
the alphanumeric strings as instructed). The baseline condition
tended to be more similar to the high control demand condition
than to the low control demand condition. This would suggest
a larger impact of experiencing the lack of the demand to con-
trol shortcut usage on performance in a subsequent incidental
learning task (rather than experiencing the demand to continue
instruction-coherent task processing). This might seem plausible
if the demand to follow instructions is default and rewarded in
everyday life (cf. Hayes et al., 1986, 2001; Törneke et al., 2008).
Currently we cannot distinguish these variants as only the differ-
ence between the low and the high control demand condition was
statistically robust.
The current study at least provides tentative evidence for dis-
tinguishing inﬂuences of control demands on applying shortcut
options from inﬂuences on learning about these shortcut options
in the ﬁrst place (cf. ErEl and Meiran, 2011). In principle, par-
ticipants in the low control demand condition might either have
been better at learning about the ﬁxed repeating sequence, better
at applying it, once they have learned about it, or both. Our mea-
sure of verbalizable sequence knowledge did not differ between
the control demand conditions (though it correlated with perfor-
mance indicators, suggesting that it was sensitive). This suggests
that the control demand conditions differed primarily in applying
rather than in knowing the ﬁxed repeating sequence in the SRT.
The ﬁnding of transfer between incidental learning tasks is
remarkable given that researchers have struggled to obtain transfer
between structurally equivalent thought problems (cf. Helfenstein
and Saariluoma, 2006; Frensch and Haider, 2008; but see Green
et al., 2010). In the current study participants seemed to transfer
the knowledge that shortcut options might exist and can be safely
exploited to a different incidental learning task presented subse-
quently. Verbal reports suggest that this knowledge was explicit.
Currently we can only speculate on the role of verbal knowledge
in transfer between incidental learning tasks as data for direct com-
parisons of transfer in incidental (i.e., with verbal knowledge) vs.
implicit learning tasks (i.e., without verbal knowledge) are lacking.
Note however that according to implicit learning studies at least
some transfer seems to be possible even without verbal knowledge
of the task regularity. For instance, Leber et al. (2009) reported
that participants who have adopted one attentional set (feature
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search mode vs. singleton detection mode) in training transferred
it to another session despite changes in the coloring of the search
targets. Turk-Browne and Scholl (2009) reported that visual sta-
tistical regularities, with respect to temporal sequence, transferred
to spatial sequencing and vice versa. Stadler et al. (2000; see also
Newell and Bright, 2002) reported the transfer of implicit knowl-
edge about deﬁning features of number strings across formats
(digits vs. words).
The ﬁnding of transfer of control demands is theoretically
relevant as such task-general inﬂuences on performance imply
the item-general operation of control processes. The current
work might contribute to alter the perspective on cognitive
control in strategy change. Some models of skill acquisition
focus on the aspect that strategy change can help to overcome
attention-demanding task processing by applying a (memory-
based) shortcut (e.g., Logan, 1988, 1992). However, in his instance
theory of automatization, strategy change (e.g., from calculating
simple arithmetic problems to retrieving the answer from mem-
ory), is a mandatory consequence of task practice. As soon as
the memory strength is sufﬁcient, the shortcut is automatically
applied. Importantly, transfer across tasks with different types of
shortcuts operating on different types of task material is not to be
expected according to the instance theory and related models of
strategy change in skill acquisition (e.g., Cousineau andLarochelle,
2004), because shortcuts are based on knowledge that has to be
acquired individually for each stimulus (e.g., the correct solution
to an arithmetic problem). According to this perspective, strategy
change relying on automatic memory retrieval of answers to for-
merly presented problems can free attentional resources. There is
neither room for transfer across incidental learning tasks, nor for
control processes that might modulate whether or not shortcut
knowledge is applied. This changes, if participants can decide to
apply or not apply a shortcut option which they have incidentally
learned (e.g., Touron and Hertzog, 2004a,b; Gaschler and Fren-
sch, 2009). According to the learning-plus-decision perspective
on strategy change in incidental learning, incidentally learning
about a shortcut option could lead to a demand of cognitive
control — namely when shortcut application leads to errors. The
current studyprovides ﬁrst evidence for that such control demands
might transfer across incidental learning tasks. It extends recent
work showing that learning processes involved in strategy change
can generalize across speciﬁc stimuli within a task: Strategy change
is not conﬁned to learning a shortcut speciﬁcally for each stimulus
(cf. Logan, 1988, 1992), but instead transfers across stimuli within
a task (cf. Gaschler et al., 2014a). For instance, Wilkins and Raw-
son (2010, p. 1134) conceptualized item-general practice gains as
performance improvements“that accrue to all stimulus tokens of a
given type, including both practiced andnovel tokens of that type.”
The current work suggests that this might even include different
tasks.
Apart from the learning-plus-decision perspective on strategy
change discussed above, there is another theoretical perspective
that can account for transfer between incidental learning tasks,
but makes different predictions for the speciﬁc pattern of trans-
fer that should occur: theories that places emphasis on potential
psychological resources needed to refrain from shortcut usage.
According to research on ego depletion (e.g., Baumeister et al.,
2007; Hagger et al., 2010), working on a demanding task can
exhaust a control resources that are then not available for the
next task to come. Assuming that high demand conditions deplete
cognitive control resources more than low demand conditions
would have led to the following prediction: Working on a task
that demands to refrain from using a shortcut option should
have led to more shortcut usage in a later incidental learning
task compared to a condition in which participants did not have
to refrain from applying a shortcut in the ﬁrst task. The least
depletion of control resources should have taken place if par-
ticipants do not have to work on a prior task at all. Thus, the
baseline condition lacking experience with either variant of Task
1 should have shown the least shortcut usage. Different from
these predictions, we obtained the strongest shortcut usage in
the SRT in the low control demand condition. The demand to
refrain from using a shortcut option in Task 1 should have dimin-
ished the capability to secure adherence to instructions in Task 2.
As the alphabet veriﬁcation task is tedious even when a part of
the material can be skipped, the low control demand condition
should have shown an intermediate level of shortcut usage, while
it should have been lowest in the baseline condition (i.e., SRT
only, hence least depleted). As we did not include independent
measures of depletion (e.g., a pre–post-test comparison of self-
reported fatigue) we are cautious to over-interpret our results with
respect to resource-theories of self-control. Note that the unex-
pected high error rate on regular trials in the baseline condition
is at odds with the resource perspective as well – rather predict-
ing a lower error rate in the least depleting condition. Instead,
our results are in line with theories that conceptualize strategy
change in incidental learning tasks as a phenomenon involving
(a) learning of the task regularity and (b) a decision to apply or
not apply the shortcut (e.g., Strayer and Kramer, 1994; Touron
and Hertzog, 2004a,b; Haider and Frensch, 2005; Haider et al.,
2005).
While past work has documented that shortcut application
can take place in an all-or-none manner, generalizing even to
novel stimuli within a task (e.g., Gaschler and Frensch, 2007;
Gaschler et al., 2014a), the current work, in addition, presents
ﬁrst evidence for transfer across different incidental learning tasks.
Distinguishing between inﬂuences of speciﬁc processing episodes
versus adaptation to general task structure is a key-problem shared
by the literature on conﬂict adaptation (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2003;
Mayr et al., 2003; Ullsperger et al., 2005; Schmidt and Besner,
2008) and the literature on strategy change in skill acquisition.
One research strategy to accumulate evidence for adaptation to
control demands (rather than to speciﬁc processing episodes with
speciﬁc stimuli) has been the study of transfer of control from one
task to another in task switching (e.g., Egner, 2008; Fernandez-
Duque and Knight, 2008; but see Rünger et al., 2010). In that
work the focus is on transfer of control between tasks on a trial-
by-trial basis. Others, have focused on learning of parameters
controlling strategy selection over many trials (e.g., Gray et al.,
2006; Gaschler and Frensch, 2009; Schouppe et al., 2014). Mod-
els of strategy selection (e.g., Rieskamp and Otto, 2006; Marewski
and Schooler, 2011) might be expanded such that they can cap-
ture task-general learning of applicability vs. non-applicability of
shortcuts.
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Last we would like to highlight that it is interesting to consider
alternative task orders to study transfer across incidental learn-
ing tasks. Transfer of control demands across incidental learning
tasks could be studied in either direction taking the alphabet ver-
iﬁcation task or the SRT as independent and dependent variable
or vice versa. Control demands could be manipulated in the SRT
by varying the amount of randomly inserted stimuli breaking the
repeating sequence (cf. Verwey and Wright, 2014). However, for
issues tied to task difﬁculty, we decided to use performance in
the alphabet veriﬁcation task as the independent variable in our
experiment, varying whether participants (a) could safely apply
a shortcut option (b) should not apply the shortcut or (c) did
not have to work on this task at all. While the SRT is instructed
as a simple choice reaction task and can be solved at reaction
time levels of one second or less per trial – even without applying
a shortcut – the alphabet veriﬁcation task is much more tedious.
Reaction times rarely reduce below three seconds per trial. From
theperspective of the egodepletion theory, this task should exhaust
more control resources when participants have to refrain from
applying a shortcut and less, when control demands are low. Yet,
even when participants can safely use the shortcut and skip to
check some positions of the alphanumeric strings, each trial still
contains a substantial amount of string positions to be checked.
Thus, even the low control demand condition should be affected
by exhaustion of control resources and thus show more shortcut
usage in Task 2 as compared to the baseline condition.
In the current setup we tested whether being able to use vs.
having to forego using a shortcut option in a demanding task
affects shortcut usage in second incidental learning task. Reversing
the order of the incidental learning tasks in future studies could
additionally challenge control resource accounts. Assuming that
the SRT is comparatively less demanding, withholding shortcut
usage in the SRT should not lead to a substantial exhaustion of
control resources. From this perspective, shortcut usage in the
alphabet veriﬁcation task should not differ depending on prior
applicability of sequence knowledge in the SRT. The learning-
plus-decision perspective on strategy change however suggests that
providing participants with the opportunity to ﬁnd and apply a
shortcut in a relatively easy task could strengthen shortcut usage in
a more difﬁcult task provided later on. Experiments on shortcut
usage in arithmetic (Godau et al., 2014) indeed reﬂect that that
offering an easy-to-ﬁnd shortcut option can increase later shortcut
usage. Therefore, the sequential regularity in the SRT (which can
be detected and applied rather easily) could foster later shortcut
usage in the alphabet veriﬁcation task, if the tasks would be applied
in the reversed order.
In summary, the present study offers a cognitive control per-
spective on strategy change in incidental learning tasks. In line
with theories conceptualizing strategy change in incidental learn-
ing as a learning-plus-decision phenomenon,we observed transfer
of control demands across incidental learning tasks. This provides
further evidence for that control processes can be distinguished
from adaptation to the speciﬁc material practiced.
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